The question of whether it is ever acceptable to profit from a species in decline is often ethically charged and invariably politically sensitive. It is also resistant to simple answers, and quick, highly visible interventions that demonstrate action in the short term often prove less effective in addressing the underlying, structural drivers of decline. In the case of the European eel fishery, this difficulty is compounded by the need to distinguish between those stakeholders indifferent to the eel’s fate and those who fish responsibly, with concern for the long-term recovery of the stock. Many fishers reinvest commercial returns into assisted migration programmes, scientific monitoring, stakeholder engagement, and other remedial measures that public authorities – including governments, NGOs, and local councils – have often proved unable, or unwilling, to deliver at sufficient scale.
This distinction becomes more significant when set against the pragmatic, if uncomfortable, possibility that without a functioning fishery the eel would lose its economic ‘value’ and, with it, visibility in the cost-benefit analyses that inform strategic decisions on land use, water management, and infrastructure development. In such circumstances, the species risks being further marginalised as economic interests, operating at much greater scale, outweigh conservation concerns, and are enabled to exert pressure on already degraded habitats. It is in this context that the Sustainable Eel Group has consistently argued that human-eel interactions are unavoidable, and cannot be zeroed, and that it is better to accommodate them, than to ban them officially, and convert them into illegal actions, going on in the night. One of the reasons SEG was established was to bring together fishers, farmers, traders, and other stakeholders around a shared interest in the eel’s long-term viability. That position, however, has always been conditional, since profit is only defensible where it remains clearly subordinate to ecological recovery and constrained within limits as defined by our Standard.
The former tendency to view the eel’s decline primarily as a fisheries problem has obscured the broader range of pressures at work and, in some cases, led to the application of management approaches better suited to marine systems. The collapse in glass eel recruitment observed in the late twentieth century emerged from the cumulative effects of multiple human activities, with fishing representing one factor, alongside habitat loss, migration barriers, pollution, hydropower generation, and wider patterns of water management. Many of these pressures originate in sectors that are significantly larger than, and sometimes directly in competition with, the eel fishery itself, yet they have historically attracted less stringent regulation and a more limited policy response. This is because fishing is well-quantified, while all other factors are not, and fishing has emerged as a dominant factor proven quantitatively, despite the fact that, without fishing, the other impacts would still lie below the protection threshold.
Within this more complex economic landscape, the Sustainable Eel Group accepts profit as a legitimate driver of behaviour, but only under conditions that are both strict and measurable and that align clearly with the objective of stock recovery. Central to this approach is compliance with the European Union’s Eel Regulation (1100/2007) and its aim of reaching a 40 per cent escapement rate – a benchmark that, in this view, should apply across all sectors affecting eel populations rather than being confined to fisheries alone. It is SEG’s view that responsibility lies with, but also extends beyond those who benefit directly from fishing activity, and should include those whose economic gains are realised indirectly through environmental impacts. All such actors are expected to minimise avoidable harm while contributing actively to recovery through verifiable commitments.
Taken together, these considerations point towards the need for a more balanced and integrated model of governance grounded in the three pillars of sustainability: People, Planet, and Profit. As a principle, the Sustainable Eel Group rejects unchecked exploitation, but it also opposes overly reductive policy responses that focus narrowly on fisheries closures, while leaving the more significant cross-sectoral pressures insufficiently addressed. In its place, SEG advances a qualified acceptance of profit that depends on demonstrable contributions to recovery, operates within clearly defined ecological limits, and helps to prevent more damaging outcomes such as unregulated exploitation. This forms part of a wider effort to reduce cumulative anthropogenic impacts, where profit is understood not as an end in itself but as a an instrument in support of the species’ long-term survival.