At the CITES Conference of the Parties last November, Canada voted against a proposal submitted by the European Union, and supported by the Sustainable Eel Group, to list all freshwater eels, including the American eel, at Appendix II. That vote, in many respects, preserved the status quo in the Canadian eel trade, even as concerns about the species’ trajectory and the scale of international demand continue to grow. Now, Fisheries and Oceans Canada is moving ahead with reopening the fishery for a second consecutive year under revised rules, including a controversial 22 per cent increase in total allowable catch to 12,180 kilogrammes.

The issue of access to the glass eel fishery remains one of the most contested elements in modern Canadian fisheries policy, and the continuation of a near-equal quota split between Indigenous and commercial harvesters has often been treated as a measured approach. In theory, it is intended to reinforce First Nations’ constitutionally protected right to fish for a moderate livelihood while maintaining order in a commercial fishery that has, in recent years, been marked by instability and enforcement challenges. Yet Mi’kmaw leadership has made clear that this framework does not resolve underlying questions of governance and authority.

Proposals from the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaw Chiefs emphasise harvester-centred management rooted in community control over river systems, rather than participation in a federally defined quota system. The federal decision to proceed with its own allocation model leaves many management issues unresolved. An all-Canada model, they say, is incompatible practical realities of a fishery driven by exceptionally high prices and low barriers to entry. With glass eels valued at $2,800 per kilogramme, fishing activity remains intense, often concentrated at night in remote locations where monitoring is difficult and tensions can quickly escalate.

Alongside governance questions, the increase in catch limits highlights uncertainty in the scientific community management about how effectively Canada is managing its eel stock. The 22 per cent rise exceeds the range of options presented in advisory processes and is based on limited indicators, including returns from a single index river. At the same time, a key limitation persists, in that stock assessments simply do not account for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, despite its well-documented presence in the fishery. Canada plays an important role in the illegal trade to east Asia, both as a source of fish and as a transit point for exports from Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Ministers have pointed to improved order in 2025, supported by new possession and export regulations, a mandatory digital traceability system, and expanded enforcement efforts that included thousands of patrols and inspections. These measures have strengthened oversight, granted, but they have not eliminated the structural challenges of policing a highly dispersed and profitable fishery. The allocation of 180 kilogrammes of quota for scientific research reflects an effort to improve the evidence base, yet a comprehensive, range-wide assessment, which recognises with the species’ single, shared population across borders, remains notably absent.

Against this backdrop, Canada’s uncompromising rejection of the EU’s CITES Appendix II proposal takes on added significance. Without a global requirement to demonstrate that exports are non-detrimental to the species, responsibility for sustainability remains largely within national jurisdictions, even as the trade itself is international in scope. SEG’s push for listing was rooted in precisely this gap, seeking to align exploitation with a coordinated, precautionary approach that reflects the eel’s transboundary biology and the history of declines seen in other anguillid species. Canada’s current tactic, combining increased harvest, enhanced traceability, and ongoing enforcement, represents an effort to manage these pressures domestically, but the science to justify it is simply not there. Whether that approach can improve sustainability in the absence of international trade controls remains an open question, and one that continues to frame the relevance of SEG’s proposal in the period following the Uzbekistan decision.